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The chemical accident in Fujian Province in April 2015 and 
frequent winter smog that often covers a large number of eastern 
Chinese cities have resulted in policy debates similar to the one 
held 10 years ago. The topic of these debates is, “Does China need 
to change its industrialization path?” By reconsidering the 2004- 
2005 Debate, the paper will focus on the policy content behind the 
controversy of economic theories and beyond, namely, the relationship 
between the theories and formation of policies in which stages of 
diversification and the M-form of Chinese governance are highlights. 
We conclude that China has experienced environment-forcing and 
state-oriented economic development paradigm shift.
Keywords: Industrial policy, Chinese economy, Hoffmann index, 
M-form
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I. Introduction
Following the explosion in the paraxylene (PX) plant in Southeast 
Fujian Province in April 2015, relatively few news reports have been 
written not only to describe the catastrophe, but also to disclose infor- 
mation on additional plants intended to be built in other provinces be- 
cause of the proven appreciably lucrative nature of PX. However, inhab- 
itants of those profit-oriented cities have demonstrated completely contra- 
dictory attitude toward the plans. Naturally, the central government stands 
with the ordinary people. 
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The chemical catastrophes, the frequent sand storms in spring, as well 
as the more frequent smog in winter and even in autumn have already 
given rise to policy debates similar to the one held 10 years ago on the 
same topic, “Does China need to change its industrialization path without 
the heavy ratio from state-owned investment and with other targets than 
unsustainable heavy industry (HI)?” (Wu 2007) 
The debate 10 years ago was induced by a researcher from a national 
think tank, and lasted for over two years. Nearly all of China’s renowned 
economists were involved, including Professor Wu Jinglian, Professor Li 
Yining, and Professor Justin Y. Lin, who were virtually the representatives 
of three different groups. The 11
th Five-Year Plan (FYP) of the year 2006- 
2010 provided an answer from the central government, who stated ex- 
plicitly that China should be transformed along a new industrial path 
with lower ratio of HI investment. However, the path was not changed 
immediately. According to official data, the amount of HI investment in 
China remained at an upward trend before and after the debate, and 
continued even in recent years, although state share in HI has been 
deliberately reduced.  
The debate and following policy process give rise to several questions. 
One question concerns the “strong government” position in China and 
other East Asian countries, that is, as one of the main former charac- 
teristics of East Asian miracles, are the public policies (WB 1993) still 
effective? Another question relates to the first question; if these public 
policies are ineffective, does it imply that East Asian economies are 
following the institutional paths of the West, only with a time lag (Aoki 
2013)? Or is there a half-way option with the challenge of sustainable 
development and late industrialization?
In the next section, we describe the background of the debate, with a 
retrospective on the HI development in China. The section III reviews 
the entire process of the debate, and compares the following policy with 
its reaction through the sector data analysis. In section IV, we analyze 
the dilemma between market and state to argue that the previous strong 
government is facing a real challenge from the market. However, the 
environmental issue also poses a challenge to the government, and devel- 
oping countries (including China) are forced to upgrade the industrial 
structure in a global context. In section V, an extensive study of other 
East Asian economies is conducted to explore the theoretical discourse 
of the policy debate. Section VI concludes with reference to the “One 
Belt One Road” policy.
CAN CHINA CHANGE ITS INDUSTRIALIZATION PATH? 215
II. Background: HI in China
China has adopted a different classification scheme of industries from 
the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (ISIC). Before 2013, all industries were divided into two cat- 
egories, following the economic guidelines from the former Soviet Union, 
namely, heavy industry and light industry. Light industry (LI) refers to 
the “industry that produces consumer goods and hand tools. It consists 
of two categories, that is, industries using farm and non-farm products 
as raw materials depending on the materials used,” while heavy industry 
(HI) refers to the “the industry which produces capital goods, and provides 
various sectors of the national economy with necessary material and 
technical basis. It consists of the following three branches, that is, (1) 
Mining, quarrying and logging industry; (2) Raw materials industry such 
as smelting and processing of metals, coking and coke chemistry; and 
(3) Manufacturing industry, which processes raw materials for other 
manufacturing sectors.” (See Appendix) 
In 2013, the industries were re-grouped according to the fourth revision 
of ISIC (ISIC4) into (1) mining, (2) manufacturing and production, and 
(3) supply of electricity, heat, gas, and water. The new system is called 
National Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (GB/T 4754- 
2011). Therefore, no new data exist for light and heavy industries since 
2013, and the statistical terms were used only for 60 years since the 
Liberation in 1949. 
Syrquin, and Chenery (1989) distinguish the industries under ISIC 
code 35-38 (ISIC1) to heavy industry, namely, chemicals and rubber (35), 
non-metallic minerals (36), basic metals (37), as well as metal products 
and machinery (38). These categories differ from the Chinese definition 
of HI in dealing with mining, quarrying, and logging industry (MQL). 
Another classification, which consists of consumer goods and capital 
goods industries or heavy and chemical industry (HCI), was made by W.G. 
Hoffmann (1958, p. 31). Both two methods are less comprehensive than 
the Chinese method, because the Chinese scheme includes all of Code 
1 (mining, B in ISIC4) and a part of Code 3 (manufacturing, C in ISIC4). 
Available value-added data on Chinese industries demonstrate that 
MQL industries contribute 15-20% of the total HI amount. In the case 
of gross output, the value is approximately 7-10% during 1993-2002. 
The difference between the Chinese HI’s definition and other versions 
can be attributed to the legacy of product-oriented and industry-chain- 
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Note: Because of issues with data availability, Hoffmann Index, which equals to 
LI output value/HI output value, is calculated using the gross output value 
instead of value-added. The MQL value-added is deducted to calculate the 
Adjusted Hoffmann Index, and pertain to the difference in statistical scope 
for HI in China.
Source: Gross output value of HI and LI from CEIC data; Hoffmann Index and 
Adjusted Hoffmann Index are the author’s calculations.
FIGURE 1 
HOFFMANN INDEX OF CHINA (1995-2002)
oriented tendency in the central planning before 1978.
In contrast to the bottom-up industrial transformation in the free 
market system, the Chinese government has adopted a Soviet economic 
strategy since the first FYP (1953-1957), which gave top priority to HI. 
The resultant industrial structure was in contrast to the one according 
to Chenery, and Syrquin Norms (1989) or Hoffmann Index (1958, p. 
146).
In the first two to three years, the Hoffmann Index was above 2, which 
characterized the first stage of industrialization from the output ratio 
viewpoint. From 1955 onwards, most of the data lay between 0.7 and 
1.3. After the Asian Financial Crisis, the Index ascended from 0.7 to 
nearly 0.5. If we simply refer to the Hoffman Index, this industrial de- 
velopment may be considered entirely quick and successful given such 
a short period. However, as we have pointed out before, the industriali- 
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zation path had depended on an unbalanced economic policy and over 
80% of the aggregated investment in HI and did not involve the process 
of free market adjustment. Only two exceptions could be found during 
the long HI-inclined development. The first exception was during the 
early 1960s, with the failure of the Great Leap Forward Campaign, which 
had a profoundly negative effect on HI in China. The second rebound 
period was at the turn of the 1980s, in the years during the implemen- 
tation of the opening policy. The vast newborn small and medium enter- 
prises during that period in both urban and rural areas had instant 
impetus on investment in LI, which had lower requirement for capital 
and relatively higher return than HI.
III. Debate on the Industrialization Path
With the background of high ratio of HI investment and continued 
strong control of the government, the debate on industrialization path 
kicked off at the beginning of the new millennium. 
A group of researchers from the Development Research Center of the 
State Council (DRC), one of the most important official think tanks in 
China, submitted an economic report (Li et al. 2003) to the central gov- 
ernment to demonstrate that China had now entered into a new stage 
of HI industrialization.  
The report was not given considerable attention until the drafting of 
the 11
th FYP, when one of the leading economists, Professor Wu Jinglian, 
submitted a counter-proposal to the State Council in July 2004, arguing 
that the Chinese HI path had become unsustainable and that a new 
reform agenda without overheated growth of HI should be pursued. As 
a leading consultant for the Chinese government, Professor Wu’s argu- 
ments are based fundamentally on policy practice instead of normative 
theories. In his later report contributed to World Bank’s East Asian 
studies, he summarized his symbolic 40,000-word proposal with four 
conditions for traditional industrialization path and seven consequences 
if the path was not be altered (Wu 2007). The latter is dubbed “seven 
stages of grief” by both Wu’s supporters and opponents. The sustainable 
conditions include government’s control over important sources, GDP as 
a benchmark for political achievements of local governors, a production- 
oriented value-added tax regime, and distorted resource prices. Those 
existing conditions lead to an overheated HI investment and overburdened 
HI sectors. If the policies were not adjusted, the following consequences 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS218
would have caused definite damage to the Chinese economy, such as 
distorted allocation of resources, delays in technological innovation and 
product upgrading, shortages in natural resources, worsened ecological 
environment, inhibited development of service sectors, inefficiency of 
capital investment, and long-term accumulated financial crisis.   
Professor Wu’s opponents come mostly from universities, and among 
them were two chief scholars, Professor Li Yining and Professor Justin 
Y. Lin from Peking University. 
Professor Li’s argument is particularly influential. He uses examples 
of advanced economies, such as those from the UK, the US, and Germany 
to demonstrate that without exception, all of China’s models of develop- 
ment have experienced the HI stage. His students and followers refer to 
the Hoffmann Index quoted by DRC researchers to support Li’s claim. 
Hoffmann’s conclusion (1958) on the common pattern for industrialization 
gained increased popularity in academic circles in China.
We propose two possible reasons for Hoffmann’s popularity in China. 
The first is because of the focus of Hoffman’s book. The book deals with 
industrialization and not general economic development, which is con- 
sistent with the policy aim of China. Furthermore, Hoffmann concludes 
separately with concrete and practical ratios, that is, 5(±1), 2.5(±1), and 
1(±0.5) for the four stages of industrialization, and with lower data on 
the fifth stage, making it absolutely convenient to study by both re- 
searchers and local officials. Second and probably more important is 
because of the procyclical tendency in the book. The author states firmly 
that “on the whole, government action has tended to foster rather than 
hamper the normal trend of industrial change,” (Hoffmann 1958, pp. 
110-111). Having a non-interference standpoint is highly necessary for 
different groups.
Compared with Professor Li, Professor Justin Y. Lin (another Wu’s 
opponent) is similar to Professor Li’s views on the non-interference ten- 
dency of economic policy. However, he differs from Professor Li in that 
he holds strongly for the comparative advantage (CA) theory, which is 
beyond his neo-classical standpoint. He is not a supporter of a totally 
free market, but a revisionist concerning his moderate attitude toward 
development strategy. His arguments have been systemized into the 
New Structural Economics (NSE) during his official term in the World 
Bank (Lin 2011). In the debate, he criticized the industrialization strat- 
egy in the 1950s, because according to the CA principle, it was unrea- 
sonable. However, the structural upgrading since 1978 has been achieved 
through market power, thereby requiring maintenance of the path. 
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Source: Fu 2014.
FIGURE 2
AN EXTENDED FRAMEWORK OF LIN’S NSE
Fu (2014) extends Lin’s framework with an analysis of benefit and 
cost of development strategy. In fact, all developing countries are rich in 
labor endowment instead of capital, but nearly all of those governments 
tend to implement development strategies with more capital-intensive 
sectors during the initial industrialization stage (Kim 2015), that is, at 
Point B, not A. The choice at B is conducive to the technological up- 
grading for enterprises with the promotion of dynamic CA-oriented gov- 
ernments. If the benefit of the policy is more than the cost, and the 
policy proves to be sustainable, then the CA is self-fulfilled, and the 
upgrading can be completed successfully. We can conclude from Lin’s 
argument and Fu’s extension that policy distortion during the structural 
change is reasonable as long as the net benefit proves to be positive.
All the arguments above demonstrate that structural change is the key 
point for Chinese economic growth. The difference lies in understanding 
the upgrading of the second sector and the attitude toward government 
interference. All arguments have been proven accurate, but along a dif- 
ferent timeline. 
The debate was ended by the new 11
th FYP in 2005. In the third chap- 
ter of the plan, upgrading of the second sector is claimed to be resource- 
saving and environment-friendly in accordance with the principle of 
“following a new industrialization path” (State Council of China 2005). 
Undoubtedly, Professor Wu’s proposal was accepted in the plan, and 
the government intends to follow decisively a non-HI industrialization 
path. In the following period of implementation, the Chinese government 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Available at: http://data.stats. 
gov.cn/
FIGURE 3
YEARLY HI INVESTMENT IN CHINA (2000-2012)
has reduced its investment in the HI sector dramatically, along with the 
privatization of state-owned assets.  
Does the policy matter? The reality was initially consistent with Profes- 
sor Li’s view on Chinese Economy. After the debate and the following 
policy on anti-HI investment, the investors have yet not to be hindered, 
and the HI investment has increased dramatically even until recent 
years. The yearly HI investment increases from 20% of the entire in- 
dustrial part to over 70% in 2012, with state investment amounting to 
only 20%, whereas private investment, including domestic and foreign 
sources, hold over 50%.   
We calculate the HI investment intensity of the state and private sec- 
tors separately to remove the privatization effect of state-owned assets 
during the same period. State HI intensity remained under the same 
trend with investment data, that is, a dramatic decrease from 2000 until 
2011. However, a slight upward trend was observed in 2012, when the 
new government was preparing to take office. Private HI intensity ex- 
hibited a stagnant curve after the new policy, with spikes upward in 
certain circumstances. Although the amount of state HI investment was 
reduced to convey a strong signal to the market, the private sector did 
not follow the signal and instead made a virtually independent decision 
to maintain its investment strategy. Confronted with the possible sys- 
tematic risk, the private sector increased investments while waiting for 
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Source: All investment data are obtained from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, Available at: http://data.stats.gov.cn/; state and 
private intensities area obtained through the author’s calculations.
FIGURE 4
STATE INVESTMENT INTENSITY VS. PRIVATE INVESTMENT INTENSITY IN HI IN 
CHINA (2000-2012)
further signal from the government. 
IV. Dilemma between Market and State  
In terms of the data obtained, Professor Li and his followers demon- 
strate forward-looking pro-HI arguments. However, HI development in 
China is not related directly to the policy process. Hence, from this 
perspective, the development cannot be attributed to the theories of Li 
or Hoffman, but rather the success of the market system.  
Syrquin, and Chenery (1989) provide a structural change norm through 
a cross-country study (1950-1983) in which the ratios of LI and HI are 
along the lines of 1.7, 1.3, 1.0, 0.8, and 0.7 at the level of GDP per 
capita from 300, 500, 1000, 2000, and 4000, respectively (1980, USD). 
Haraguchi (2014) adopts a similar method for dividing early, middle, 
and late industries as that utilized by Chenery, and Taylor (1968), and 
describes the development pattern with more recent UNIDO data (1963- 
2007). Compared with these preliminary studies, China’s industrialization 
path is distinctly over-speeded because of the previously unbalanced 
policy (See Figure 5). Hence, the question then becomes, “When did the 
transformation appear?” 
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Note: To maintain comparability through the entire research period (1952-2011), 
Chinese yearly GDP per capita is calculated from RMB data using the 
official exchange rate. Because of issues data availability, Hoffmann Index, 
which is equal to LI output value/HI output value, is calculated using the 
gross output value instead of value-added. The MQL value-added is de- 
ducted to calculate the Adjusted Hoffmann Index pertaining to the differ- 
ences in statistical scope for HI in China.   
Source: Gross output value of HI and LI are obtained from CEIC data; GDP per 
capita from the CEIC data; author’s calculations
FIGURE 5
HOFFMANN INDEX OF CHINA 2003-2011
Imbs, and Wacziarg (2003) demonstrate another form of industrial 
evolution in the different stages of economic development. As the per 
capita income increases, the sector concentration follows a U-shaped 
pattern in accordance with specialization and geographic agglomeration. 
They observe that the minimum point occurs when per capita income 
equals approximately USD 9,575 per year (See Figure 6), and in China’s 
case, the country still remains at the pre-specialization phase (1969- 
1997) (See Figure 7). Zhang, and Cheng (2007) calculate the Gini Index 
for China from 1988 to 2008, and obtain a similar U-shaped pattern 
with the minimum point at the level of per capita income of RMB 
11,129. The turning year is 2003, which is similar to the turning point 
of the industrialization policy (See Figure 8).
The theory of specialization stage contributes to the understanding of 
China’s private investment into the HI. Sector concentration leads to more 
investments in HI because of the high possible return from the scale 
economy and the tendency of specialization, which is a reasonable al- 
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Early Food and beverages, Tobacco, Textiles, Wearing apparel, Wood 
Products, Publishing, Furniture
Non-metallic minerals




Late Rubber and plastic
Motor vehicles
Chemicals, Machinery and equipment, Electrical machinery and 
apparatus, Precision instruments
Note: Manufacturing subsectors are classified into early, middle, and late in- 
dustries if an industry’s share in GDP is estimated to peak before USD 
6,500 GDP per capita in PPP (constant 2005 prices), between USD 6,500 
and USD 15,000, and after USD 15,000, respectively. These income 
ranges correspond to our income classifications: low and lower middle, 
upper middle, and high incomes in terms of GDP per capita PPP. Table 
1 lists the industries that peaked at the lowest income level up to those 
that peaked at the highest income level in terms of their value added 
share in GDP. Industries that peaked at approximately the same income 
level are listed horizontally.
Source: Haraguchi 2014.
TABLE 1
DEVELOPMENT STAGES OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Source: Imbs, and Wacziarg 2003.
FIGURE 6 
ESTIMATED CURVE OF SECTOR CONCENTRATION-
GINNI INDEX-UNIDO THREE-DIGIT VALUE-ADDED DATA
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Source: Imbs, and Wacziarg 2003.
FIGURE 7
GINI AND INCOME PER CAPITA IN CHINA- ILO 
ONE-DIGIT EMPLOYMENT DATA
    
                 Source: Zhang, and Cheng 2012.
FIGURE 8
GINI AND INCOME PER CAPITA IN CHINA (1988-2008)
location of resource with the increase in income and conforms to 
Professor Lin’s argument.
Market evolution was strengthened within the M-form organizational 
structure of the Chinese local governments (Qian, Ronald, and Xu 2006). 
One of the most important forces of China’s HI boom after 2004 origin- 
ated from the pooling effect of local investments, such as the swarming 
PX projects at that time. Local officials were responsible for the growth 
rate in their own regions, and were free to some extent, to implement 
regional industrial policies. 
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Source: Qian, Ronald, and Xu 2006.
FIGURE 9
M-FORM VS. U-FORM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The Soviet economy can be viewed as a gigantic U-form coordinating spe- 
cialized production in the whole economy... The U-form organization was also 
replicated at the level of individual ministries... In contrast to the Soviet 
Union, central planning in China was organized mainly along territorial lines. 
Regional governments were responsible for the whole array of production in 
their region... The Chinese economy can be viewed as one gigantic M-form 
where each region resembles a division in an M-form corporation. (Qian, Ronald, 
and Xu 2006, also see Figure 9) 
 
At the turning point of specialization, many local governments pooled 
physical and financial resources for large-scale projects in sectors, such 
as automobiles, steel, and iron to improve their political achievements. 
Most collective-owned enterprises are under the control of local govern- 
ments. Furthermore, the race-to-the-bottom competition for FDI induced 
foreign enterprises to establish business not only in the East developed 
area, but also in the West undeveloped provinces, despite the possible 
negative effects on the environment. 
The environmental factor simply leads to an attitude change in ordinary 
people toward the industrialization path, and forces investors to decrease 
the HI share of their investment. From this perspective, Professor Wu is 
correct in the long term. The new government has reinforced the trend 
and adjusted the M-form structure of local governments through a series 
of effective measures.
V. East Asian Experiences
Other East Asian countries, including Japan (Yang 1990) and Korea 
(Kim 2015) have also experienced an HI policy and investment boom 
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HEAVY AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY DRIVE IN SOUTH KOREA
after World War II. If we attribute nearly all the policy impetus in China 
to its socialist ally, then we cannot explain Japan and Korea’s policy 
processes using the same feature. In this section, we intend to discuss 
the correlativity between the regulation efficiency and HI to complete 
the policy debate.  
The experience of South Korea conforms to the three-stage theory of 
Auty (1994), that is, the HCI big push construction boom, a GDP slow- 
down, and a HCI Rebound. Table 2 shows the first stage of big push 
during the period of 1975-1980. Both the HCI share in manufacturing 
value-added and manufacturing exports increase distinctively and con- 
tinuously. However, the 1980s saw a temporary slow-down in Korea’s HCI 
resulting from the depressed “domestic demand below its long-term 
trend just as many HCI projects are struggling on stream.” Coincidentally, 
South Korea experienced a democratic movement in the 1980s, which 
proved to be a real challenge to the Korean government. Following the 
stabilization of HCI, the government regained its power and efficiency 
(see Figure 10).
HI (HCI in Japan and Korea’s cases) is well-known to have been en- 
dowed with a political meaning at the very beginning of industrialization, 
especially in developing countries. Is there any relativity between the 
power of governments and ratio of HI investment as well as value-added, 
considering the position of strong government in East Asia?
We place the Hoffmann index and Regulatory quality index in the 
same figure to demonstrate the possible interaction between the two 
factors. Unfortunately, the relativity proved to be insignificant at first 
glance. The government’s efficiency decreased significantly as the HI share 
began to increase at the end of the 1990s. However, the country’s entry 
into the WTO in 2001 improved the regulatory quality for approximately 
five years. Regulation efficiency stagnated when the state-owned HI in- 
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Source: Adjusted Hoffmann Index of China are from the author’s calculations; 
Regulatory quality index are obtained from the Worldwide Governance 




REGULATORY QUALITY INDEX IN CHINA, JAPAN, AND KOREA (1996-2013)
vestment decreased and HI ratio increased thereafter. With limited data, 
we cannot obtain further results. A comparative study across countries 
may be a good solution, and the catch-up cycle among the East Asian 
countries could provide another solution (Lee, and Malerba 2016).     
VI. Concluding remarks
We focus on the 2004-2005 policy debate on the industrialization 
path in China, and find that the free market system has been gradually 
strengthened through the country’s industrial transformation. The 
debaters were divided into three groups, and all of them prove to be 
persuasive, albeit, along a different timeline. An extensive study of the 
other East Asian countries may disclose the relation between HI and 
governments’ efficiency. 
China has experienced an economic transition from an unbalanced- 
HI-centered and outward path to a balanced-sectored and inward de- 
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velopment. The strong demand for sustainable environment and concern 
for middle-income trap have reinforced the position of the Chinese govern- 
ment. The One Belt and One Road strategy is an active state-oriented 
response to the transition, through which the over-loaded industrial 
sectors can be transferred overseas and new catch-up cycles be formed 
worldwide.
At the end of Hoffmann’s book (1958, p. 151), the author asks, “Would 
it be reasonable to anticipate a situation in which only 9 percent of the 
industrial output of a country consisted of consumer goods and 91 per 
cent of capital goods?” He responds with a negative answer. We hope 
that in the future, we can answer in the same way. 
(Received 5 October 2015; Revised 26 January 2016; Accepted 26 
January 2016) 
Appendix: Statistical Definition of Industrial Terms
Available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ClassificationsMethods/ 
Definitions/200205/t20020517_72382.html, downloaded on April 1, 
2015.
A. Industry
Industry refers to the material production sector engaged in the ex- 
traction of natural resources and processing as well as the reprocessing of 
minerals and agricultural products, including the extraction of natural re- 
sources, such as mining, salt production, logging (but excluding hunting 
and fishing); processing and reprocessing of farm and sideline produces, 
such as rice husking, flour milling, wine making, oil pressing, cotton gin- 
ning, silk reeling, spinning and weaving, and leather making; manufac- 
turing of industrial products, such as steel making, iron smelting, chem- 
icals manufacturing, petroleum processing, machine building, timber 
processing; water and gas production and electricity generation and 
supply; and repairing of industrial products, such as the repair of 
machinery and means of transport (including cars).
Prior to 1984, the rural industry run by villages and cooperative or- 
ganizations within a village was classified into agriculture; since 1984, 
it has been grouped into industry.
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B. Units of Industrial Statistics and Inquiry
These units are classified into two categories: (B.1.) corporate industrial 
enterprises with independent accounting system and (B.2.) industrial 
establishments.
B.1. Corporate industrial enterprises with independent accounting 
system refer to enterprises engaged in industrial production activities, 
which meet the following requirements: 1. The enterprises are legally 
established, with their own names, organizations, location, and can face 
civil liability; 2. The enterprises possess and use their assets indepen- 
dently, assume liabilities, and can sign contracts with other units; and 
3. They are financially independent, and compile their own balance 
sheets.
B.2. Industrial establishments refer to economic units located in one 
single place and engaged entirely or primarily in one type of industrial 
activity, including financially independent industrial enterprises and 
units engaged in industrial activities under the non-industrial enter- 
prises (or financially dependent). Industrial establishments generally meet 
the following requirements: 1. These establishments have one location 
each, and are individually engaged in one type of industrial activity; 2. 
They separately operate and manage their industrial production activities; 
and 3. They have separate accounts of income and expenditures.  
B.2.1. State-owned Enterprises refer to industrial enterprises wherein 
the means of production or income are owned by the state. Joint state- 
private and private industries, which existed before 1957, have been 
transformed into state industries. Statistics on these enterprises have 
been included in state-owned industries since 1957 when separation of 
data was no longer necessary.
B.2.2. Collective-owned Enterprises refer to industrial enterprises 
wherein the means of production are owned collectively, including urban 
and rural enterprises invested by collectives and some enterprises. The 
latter were formerly owned privately, but have been registered in indus- 
trial and commercial administration agency as collective units through 
fund raised from the public. 
B.2.3. Share-holding Corporations refer to economic units registered 
in accordance with the regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Management of Registration of Corporate Enterprises, with total re- 
gistered capitals divided into equal shares and raised through the is- 
suance of stocks. Each investor bears limited liability to the corporation 
depending on the shares held, and the corporation bears liability to its 
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debt to the maximum of its total assets.
B.2.4. Enterprises with Funds from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
refer to all industrial enterprises registered as joint venture, cooperative, 
sole (exclusive) investment industrial enterprises, and limited liability 
corporations with funds coming from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.
B.2.5. Foreign Funded Enterprises refer to all industrial enterprises 
registered as joint venture, cooperative, sole (exclusive) investment in- 
dustrial enterprises, and limited liability corporations with foreign funds.
B.2.6. Industry of Other Types of Ownership refers to industrial ente- 
rprises (units) of ownership other than state-owned, collective, and indi- 
vidual enterprises. These enterprises include private, joint-owned, share- 
holding economy (companies limited by shares and companies limited 
with liabilities), foreign-funded enterprises (Sino-foreign joint ventures, 
Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises and exclusive foreign ventures who 
have their own investment), as well as enterprises funded by the entre- 
preneurs from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (joint ventures and co- 
operative enterprises with the mainland as well as ventures exclusively 
with their own investment). 
C. Light Industry
Light Industry refers to the industry that produces consumer goods 
and hand tools. It consists of the following two categories, depending on 
the materials used: 
C.1. Industries using farm products as raw materials. These indus- 
tries are branches of the light industry, which use farm products directly 
or indirectly as basic raw materials, including the manufacture of food 
and beverages, tobacco processing, textile, clothing, fur and leather 
manufacturing, paper making, printing, and so on.
C.2. Industries using non-farm products as raw materials. These 
industries are branches of the light industry, which use manufactured 
goods as raw materials, including the manufacture of cultural, educa- 
tional articles and sports goods, chemicals, synthetic fiber, chemical 
products for daily use, glass products for daily use, metal products for 
daily use, hand tools, medical apparatus and instruments, and the 
manufacture of cultural and clerical machinery.
D. Heavy Industry
Heavy Industry refers to the industry that produces capital goods and 
provides various sectors of the national economy with necessary material 
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and technical basis. This industry consists of the following three bran- 
ches, which has been categorized according to the purpose of production 
or the use of products:
D.1. Mining, quarrying, and logging industry refers to the industry 
that extracts natural resources, including extraction of petroleum, coal, 
metal and non-metal ores, as well as logging.
D.2. Raw materials industry refers to the industry that provides various 
sectors of the national economy with raw materials, fuels, and power. It 
includes smelting and processing of metals; coking and coke chemistry; 
chemical materials and building materials, such as cement, plywood, 
and power; petroleum refining; and coal dressing.
D.3. Manufacturing industry refers to the industry that processes raw 
materials. This industry includes the machine building industry, which 
equips sectors of the national economy, industries of metal structure 
and cement products, and industries producing means of agricultural 
production, such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Following the 
principles of the classification above, the repair trades, which are en- 
gaged primarily in repairing products of heavy industry, are classified 
into heavy industry, whereas the trades engaged in repairing products 
of light industry are classified into light industry.
E. Gross Industrial Output Value
Gross Industrial Output Value is the total volume of industrial products 
sold or available for sale in value terms, which reflects the total achieve- 
ments and overall scale of industrial production during a given period. 
This value includes the value of the finished products, which are not to 
be processed further in the enterprises and have been inspected, packed 
and put in storage, the value of industrial services rendered to other 
units, and the changes in the value of the semi-finished products, as 
well as products in the process between the beginning and closing of 
the period. The gross industrial output value is calculated using the 
“factory method.” No double calculations are to be made within the same 
enterprise. However, double counting does occur among different enter- 
prises.
F. Output value of light and heavy industries 
Output value of light and heavy industries is further classified using 
the “factory” method. Under normal conditions, if the major products of 
an industrial enterprise belong to light industry products, the gross 
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output value of that enterprise is classified wholly into light industry; 
the same principle applies to heavy industry.
G. Value-added of Industry
Value-added of Industry refers to the final results of industrial pro- 
duction of the industrial trade in money terms during the reference 
period.
References
Aoki, Masahiko. “Historical Sources of Institutional Trajectories in Econ- 
omic Development: China, Japan and Korea compared.” Socio- 
Economic Review 11 (No. 2 2013): 233-63.
Auty, Richard. “Industrial Policy Reform in Six Large Newly Industrializing 
Countries: The Resource Curse Thesis.” World Development 22 
(No.1 1994): 11-26.
Chenery, Hollis, and Lance Taylor. “Development Patterns among Coun- 
tries and Over Time.” Review of Economics and Statistics 50 (No. 4 
1968): 391-416.  
Fu, Cai Hui. fazhan zhanlve de chengben yu shouyi: yige fenxi kuangjia 
[Cost and Benefit of Development Strategy: a Framework], Nanfang 
Jingji [South China Journal of Economics] (No. 1 2014): 29-48 (in 
Chinese). 
Haraguchi, Nobuya. Patterns of Structural Change and Manufacturing 
Development. UNIDO Working Paper 2014/7, 2014.   
Hoffmann, Walter. The Growth of Industrial Economies. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1958. 
Imbs, Jean, and Romain Wacziarg. “Stages of Diversification.” American 
Economic Review 93 (No. 1 2003): 63-86. 
Kim, Djun Kil. “A Schumpeterian Analysis of the Saemaul Undong 
Movement in 1970s South Korea within the CDD Framework.” 
Seoul Journal of Economics 28 (No. 4 2015): 415-53. 
Lee, Keun, and Franco Malerba. “Toward a Theory of Catch-up Cycles and 
Changes in Industrial Leadership: Windows of Opportunity and 
Responses by Firms and Countries in the Evolution of Sectoral 
Systems.” Research Policy, Special Issue, forthcoming, 2016.     
Li, Zuo Jun. shi jingji guore haishi gongyehua jinru xin jieduan? [The 
Economy is Overheated or it is a start to a new industrialization 
stage?], DRC Research Report No. 2006, 2003 (in Chinese).  
CAN CHINA CHANGE ITS INDUSTRIALIZATION PATH? 233
Lim, Won Hyuk. Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive, 2012. Available at: 
http://cid.kdi.re.kr/upload/20120808_1.pdf downloaded on 
January 5 2015. 
Lin, Justin Yifu. “New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking 
Development.” The World Bank Research Observer 26 (No. 2 2011): 
193-221.  
Qian, Ying Yi, Gérard Ronald, and Cheng Gang Xu. “Coordination and 
Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations.” Journal of 
Political Economy 114 (No. 2 2006): 336-402. 
State Council of China. zhonghuarenmingongheguo guomin jingji he shehui 
fazhan dishiyige wunian guihua gangyao [The 11
th Five Year Plan 
of National Economy and social development of People’s Republic 
of China], 2005. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/ 
2006-03/16/content_4309517.htm, downloaded on January 5 
2015 (in Chinese).    
Syrquin, Moshe, and Hollis Chenery. Patterns of development, 1950 to 
1983. World Bank Discussion Papers No. 41, 1989. 
World Bank. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Wu, Jinglian. “Does China Need to Change Its Industrialization Path?” In 
Gill, Indermit, Yu Kong Huang, and Homi Kharas (eds.), East 
Asian Visions: Perspectives on Economic Development, The World 
Bank and The Institute of Policy Studies, pp. 285-308, 2007.
Yang, Dong Hyu. “A Note on Japanese Industrialization Pattern in 
Comparative Perspective.” Seoul Journal of Economics 3 (No. 4 
1990): 327-48.
Zhang, Jian Hua, and Wen Cheng. zhongguo diqu zhuanyehua yanbian de 
U-xing guilve [The U-shaped Pattern of Regional Specialization in 
China], zhongguo shehui kexue [Social Sciences in China] (No. 1 
2012): 76-97 (in Chinese).

